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PRIOR STATEMENTS OF ONE'S OWN WITNESS TO
COUNTERACT SURPRISE TESTIMONY: HEARSAY
AND IMPEACHMENT UNDER THE
"DAMAGE" TEST*
A PARTY may impeach the credibility of his own witnesses 1 by proving
that they have made prior statements out of court inconsistent with their
positions at trial.2 While early common law forbade impeachment of one's
*People v. LeBeau, 39 Adv. Cal. Rep. 151, 245 P.2d 302 (1952); Bassett v. Crisp,
113 Adv. Cal. App. 334, 248 P.2d 171 (1952). And see People v. Spinosa, 115 Adv. Cal.
App. 773, 252 P.2d 409 (1953).
1. A witness is generally considered to be the witness of that party for whom he
first furnishes relevant evidence. E.g., Milton v. State, 40 Fla. 251, 24 So. 60 (1898);
see State v. Hulbert, 299 Mo. 572, 575, 253 S.W. 764, 766 (1923). Some courts have
held, however, that when a witness is called by both parties, he is the witness of each
to the extent of the testimony elicited by each. E.g., Smith v. Blakesburg Savings Bank,
182 Iowa 1190, 164 N.W. 762 (1917); Parr v. Parr, 207 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. Civ. App.
1947). In those jurisdictions in Which cross-examination is restricted to matters brought out
in direct examination, a party may make a witness his own by inquiring into other matters.
E.g., State v. Richardson, 63 Mont. 322, 207 Pac. 124 (1922) ; Cavalier v. Bittner, 186
Misc. 848, 60 N.Y.S.2d 355 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
Where a party obviously does not vouch for the witness' credibility, he does not make
the witness his own by calling him to testify. E.g., Necessary witnesses: lit rc Warren's
Estate, 138 Ore. 283, 4 P.2d 635 (1931) (subscribing witness to a will); Meeks v. United
States, 179 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1950) (witnesses whom the prosecution is required to call) ;
Commonwealth v. Festo, 251 Mass. 275, 145 N.E. 700 (1925) (same); cf. People v. Connor,
295 Mich. 1, 294 N.W: 74 (1940). Party-opponent: IDAHO CODE § 9-1206 (1948); MAsS.
ANN. LAWS c. 233, § 22 (1933); contra: Drennen v. Lindsey, 15 Ark. 359 (1854);
Lawton Savings Bank v. Bremer, 205 Iowa 334, 218 N.W. 49 (1928). Some states provide
that an adverse party is to be examined subject to the same rules of examination as any
other witness. E.g., 2 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 97-12 (1939) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-569 (1943) ;
WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1225 (Remington, 1932). If a party is unwilling to vouch for
the credibility of a witness, he may be able to persuade the court to call the witness, who
may then be impeached by both parties. E.g., Peoples v. State, 257 Ala. 295, 58 So.2d 599
(1952) ; People v. Bote, 379 Ill. 345, 40 N.E.2d 55 (1942). See, generally, on who is a party's
witness, 3 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 909-18 (3d ed. 1940).
2. Normally, impeachment by a party of his own witness is limited to proof of
prior contradictions. For the party's right to show possible bias, interest, or corruption
of his own witness, see 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 901. In addition, three states allow
evidence of bad character if the witness is "indispensable." 28 APX. STAT. ANN. § 706
(1947) ; Ky. Civ. CODE oF PRAc. § 596 (Carroll, 1948) ; IND. STAT. ANN. § 2-1726 (Burns
Cum. Repl., 1946) (also "in a case of manifest surprise"). Proof of bad character will
also be allowed where a witness is not classified as a witness of the party calling him.
See note 1 mipra. When a party is called as a witness by his opponent, proof of bad
character may also be allowed under statutes providing for examination of such a witness
"in all respects as if he had been called by the adverse party" or "according to the rules
applicable to cross-examination." 21 Aiuz. CODE ANN. § 922 (1939); CoLo. STAT. ANN,
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own witnesses,3 the danger that a litigant's case might be seriously harmed
by his own witnesses' unexpectedly adverse testimony led legislatures and
courts to modify the prohibition.4 But the admission of a witness' extra-
c. 177, § 16 (1935); MicH. ST.AT. ANxN § 27.915 (1938); MiNN. STAT. A;z:z. § 595.03
(1944); MoNT. REv. CODE § 93-1901-9 (1947); N.H. REv. LAWS c. 392, § 24 (1942);
OHIO Gmx. CODE ANN. § 11497 (Page, 1937); 28 PA. STAT. ANN. § 3S1 (Purdon, 1930);
8 VA.. CODE ANx. § 291 (fichie, 1950).
A party may always prove by other witnesses that the facts are otherwise than as
testified to by a witness, in spite of the incidental impeaching effect. E.g., Jacobson
v. Mutual Ben. Health and Accident Ass'n, 70 N.D. 566, 296 N.W. 545 (1941); State v.
Nelson, 192 S.C. 422, 7 S.E.2d 72 (1940). The party also has the dubious privilege of
having an adverse witness who surprises him withdrawn and his testimony stricken. Kuhn
v. United States, 24 F.2d 910 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 605 (192S).
3. For the history of the rule and speculation as to its origins, see Ladd, Iipcach-
ment of One's Own Tritnss-Xcv Developments, 4 U. oF CHL L RLA. 9 (193); 3
,ViGyo.E, Evi--cE §§ 896-903.
4. Sixteen jurisdictions have general statutes which permit a party to impeach his
own witness by showing "that he has made at other times, statements inconsistent ith
his present testimony.... ." ALASrKA Comip. LAWS A,,N. § 534-59 (1948); 2S ,;A:. STAT.
ANN. § 706 (194); CAL CODE CIV. Paoc. § 2049 (Deering, 1946) ; D.C. Co[, § 14-104
(1951) (if "party producing [witness] has been taken by surprise"); FLa,. STAT. AN:N.
§ 90.09 (1943) (if witness "prove[s] adverse") ; GA. CoDE AN;sN. § 3S-lM0I (Supp. 1951 #
(if witness "entraps" the party calling him); IDAHo Cor § 9-1207 (194S); IND. STr.
AN-. §§ 2-1726, 2-1727, 2-1728 (Burns Cum. Repl., 1946) ; Ky. Civ. Coz oF PrzA. § 594
(Carroll, 1948) ; 'MASS. ANN-i. LAws c. 233, § 23 (1932) ; Mo:vT. REv. CODE § 93-1901-3
(1947) ; N.Mf. STAT. ANN. § 20-204 (1941) (if witness is "adverse"); Uin. Cnw. LAws
§ 4-709 (1940); VT. STAT. § 1743 (1947) (if witness is "adverse"); 8 VA. STAT.
ANN. § 292 (Michie, 1950) (if witness is "adverse") ; Wyo. Com't. STAT. ANN. § 3-2tA
(1945).
The statutes of Louisiana and Te-as apply only in criminal cases. 15 L. PRV. STAT.
§ 487 (1950) (if witness' testimony "surprises" the party calling him or the witnes
shows "hostility" towards the party); TEX. CODE Clml. Proc. art. 732 (Vernon, 1941 !
(if the witness' testimony is "injurious" to the cause of the party calling him). The
civil cases are similarly handled through judicial decision. Leadman v. Querlios, 163 So.
745 (La. App. 1935); Federal Underwriters Exchange v. Rattler, 192 S.WV2d 942 (Te%.
Civ. App. 1946).
In twelve states statutory provisions cover impeachment of one's own witness only
when the witness is a party called by his opponent. 21 Amz. CoDz Am.. § 922 (1939)
(also allows an "unwilling or hostile witness" to be asked leading questions); COLO.
STAT. ANN. c. 177, § 16 (1935); ILL. STAT. ANN. c. 110, § 184 (Smith-Hurd, 194);
M.. Rrv. STAT. c. 100, § 119 (1944) ; MicH. STAT. ANN. § 2.915 (1935) ; M N:xi. STAT.
ANN. § 595.03 (1946) ; Miss. CODE ANN. § 1710 (1942) ; Mo. STAT. § 491.030 (Vernon,
1952) ; NEv. Comp. LAws § 9420 (1929) ; N.H. Rrv. LAws c. 392, § 24 (1942) ; OHio GEN.
CODE ANw. § 11497 (Page, 1937); 28 PA. STAT. ANN. § 3S1 (Purdon, 1930). In these
states judicial decisions have extended impeachment to other situations. E.g., Fjellman
v. Veller, 213 Minn. 457, 7 N.W.2d 521 (1942) (youth of the witness and leading nature
of cross-examination); Clancy v. St. Louis Transit Co., 192 Mo. 615, 91 S.W. E09
(1905) (party "surprised" by the testimony of his own witness).
Two states have statutes which allow impeachment of one's own xvitness by prior
inconsistent statements only when the statements are contained in depositiuns. 3 MDW. Cor:,
GE.u. RuLEs OF PRA. AND PRcO., Section 1, Rule 11(a)(1) (Flack, 1951); S.D. Cur:
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judicial statements for impeachment purposes conflicts, in practice, with the
policy embodied in the hearsay rule. The hearsay rule forbids admission of
an assertion whose truth may not be tested by cross-examination, unless the
circumstances under which the statement was made afford some assurance
of its truth.5 An extra-judicial statement may be admitted for impeachment
purposes, however, without regard to safeguards which ensure its probative
value. Courts rationalize the admission of impeaching statements without
safeguards on the theory that the truth of the statement is not considered by
the jury. Rather, the jury decides whether the witness made the prior state-
ment, and if he did, the statement is relevant only to the extent that the
contradiction in the witness' story reflects upon his credibility.6 Indeed, the
court will charge the jury to this effect. 7 But it is generally conceded that
most juries ignore the instruction." And since the judge may enforce the
§ 36.0506(1) (1939). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d) (1). But in these jurisdictions, courts
may permit impeachment without depositions. See Young v. United States, 97 F.2d 200,
205-06 (5th Cir. 1938).
The Wisconsin statute, applicable only in criminal proceedings, allows impeachment
where the judge regards the witness as "hostile" and the prior statement is contained
in a writing approved by the witness or in a "phonographic report." Wxs. STAT. § 325.35
(1951). In civil cases, the matter is wholly within the discretion of the trial court.
In re Krause's Estate, 241 Wis. 41, 44, 4 N.W.2d 122, 124 (1942).
New York, in 1937, adopted a statute which allows impeachment if prior contradictory
statements are contained in a writing subscribed to by the witness or were made under
oath. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 343-a; N.Y. CODE Crm. PRoc. § 8-a. On the New York
law and other proposals urged for adoption in that State, see Holtzoff, The New York
Rule as to Inpeachniett by a Party of His Own; Witness, 24 CoL. L. RaV. 715 (1924) ;
Ladd, supra note 3, at 91-4; Schatz, Impeachment of One's Own Witness: Present
New York Law and Proposed Changes, 27 CoRe. L.Q. 377 (1942).
In all other jurisdictions courts alone have altered the common law rule. R~g.,
Johnson v. Hager, 148 Kan. 461, 83 P.2d 621 (1938) ; Stappenbeck v, Jagels Fuel Corp.,
131 N.J.L. 215, 35 A.2d 631 (1944) ; Morton v. Hood, 105 Utah 484, 143 P.2d 434 (1943).
5. 5 WIGMoRE, EvmcE § 1362.
6. E.g., Ellis v. United States, 138 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1943) ; 3 WxaMoRF, EvInaNcE
§ 1018. Contra: Pulitzer v. Chapman, 337 Mo. 298, 318, 85 S.W.2d 400, 410 (1935)
(deposition considered as affirmative evidence even though deponent present at trial,
since deposition is given under oath and deponent was subject to cross-examination when
the statement was made). The Supreme Court of Missouri has since retreated from its
position. Borrson v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. Ry., 351 Mo. 229, 244, 172 S.W.2d 835, 845
(1943).
Where the witness is a party to the action, his prior statements may be admitted
affirmatively as admissions against interest. 4 WIGMORE EVIDENCE §§ 1048-87. Contra:
Moses v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 239 Mo. App. 361, 373, 188 S.W2d 538, 544
(1945).
7. E.g., Epps v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 93, 56 S.E.2d 237 (1949). A limiting
instruction must be requested or failure to give such an instruction may not be raised on
appeal. State v. Moseley, 133 Me. 168, 175 Atl. 307 (1934). But ef. Shepard v. United
States, 290 U.S. 96 (1933).
8. "The possibility that the jury may accept as the truth the earlier statements il
preference to those made upon the stand is indeed real .. " L. Hand, J., in Di Carlo v.
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policy behind the instruction only where he takes the case from a jury,9
laiyers frequently attempt to introduce extra-judicial statements as impeach-
ing exidence when their real hope is that the jury will consider as true the
facts which the prior statement asserts. 10
To minimize misuse of the impeachment privilege, courts admit prior
statements of a party's w~ritness only in limited circumstances. Generally,
the witness must have "entrapped" or "surprised" the party by his testimony
at the trial."' This forestalls the possibility that counsel will place a witness
on the stand, kmowing his testimony will be unfavorable, solely to introduce
a prior statement of the witness. In addition, a party's interest in neutralizing
the unexpected testimony must outweigh the danger that the jury will con-
sider the content of the impeaching statement as evidence of the facts it asserts,
rather than evidence of the witness' credibility.'- Thus, before a witness'
United States, 6 F.2d 364, 369 (2d Cir.), cert. denid, 268 U.S. 70"6 (1925). See United
States v. Block, 88 F.2d 618, 620 (2d Cir.), cert. denicd, 301 U.S. 6,90 (1937); United
States ex reL Ng Kee Wong v. Corsi, 65 F2d 564, 565 (2d Cir. 1933). And see
McCormick, The Tunicoat Witness: Prcvious Statements as Snbstanth'!e E.zidence, 25
TzK. L. REv. 573, 580 n.17 (1947); 1 ViGmORt, EvmEcN § 13.
9. This may be done only when the prior statement is the party's only evidence on
a vital point and his opponent is entitled to a directed verdict or a judgment .o.v. E.g.,
Rashaw v. Central Vermont Ry., 133 F2d 253 (2d Cir. 1943); Smith V. Pelz, 3M4 Ill.
446, 51 N.E.2d 534 (1943) ; Frick v. Bickel, 115 Ind. App. 114, 54 N._2d 436, aff'd, 226
Ind. 610, 57 N.E.2d 62 (1944).
10. For judicial warnings against this practice, see Young v. United States, 97 F2d
200, 205-06 (5th Cir. 1938) ; State v. Delaney, 161 Wash. 614, 297 Pac. 203 (1931).
11. Occasionally the requirement of surprise is strictly enforced. See Gondel: v.
Pliska, 135 Conn. 610, 67 A2d 552 (1949) ; In re Paradis' Will, 87 A2d 512 (' Me. 1952) ;
Dick v. King, 73 Mont. 456, 236 Pac. 1093 (1925); R & S Auto Service v. McGill, 205
Okla. 495, 238 P.2d 1089 (1951). In a few states it is necessary that the prior statement
have been made to the party or his counsel in order that the party may claim "surprise."
D.C. CODE § 14-104 (1951) ; GA. CoDz AxN. § 33-1801 (Supp. 1951); Sparks v. State,
209 Ga. 250, 71 S.E.2d 603 (1952): State, for Use of Chenoweth v. Baltimore Contracting
Co., 177 Md. 1, 6 A.2d 625 (1939) ; Selden v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 157 Pa. Super.
500, 43 A.2d 571 (1945).
In general, however, a mere claim of surprise will suffice. "[T]he claim of surprice
has become largely a gesture, which adds little or nothing to the trial court's discre-
tion... " London Guarantee and Accident Co. v. Woelfle, 83 F.2d 3P5, 334 (Sth Cir.
1936). See also People v. Spinosa, 115 Adv. Cal. App. 773, 782, 252 P.2d 409, 415 (1953).
In some jurisdictions "surprise" need not even be claimed, Brooks v. Wed:s, 121
Mass. 433 (1877), or is not necessary where a witness is "hostile," State v. Williams,
185 La. 849, 171 So. 52 (1936). The Louisiana definition of "surprise" seems unique:
"surprise... does not arise out of the mere failure of the witness to testify as e. pected,
but of his testifying on some material matter against the party introducing him and in
favor of the other side." 15 L. Rnv. STAT. § 4S3 (1950). Occasionally it is held that a
witness' prior statements may be introduced to show surprise. State v. Billberg, 229 1ow.t
1208, 296 N.W. 396 (1941) ; Moore v. State, 147 Neb. 390, 23 N.W.2d 552 (194G).
12. See 1 WiGmoIrm EvIDExcE § 13; People v. Newson, 37 Cal2d 34, 41, 230 P2d
618, 622-3 (1951): "The testimony which may be contradicted must be prejudicial and
detrimental, otherwise previous statements shown would stand out, not as offsetting
contrary testimony already given, but as substantive evidence of a fact."
1953]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
credibility can be impeached, his testimony must "damage" the case of the
party calling him.13 Courts have adopted a rule of thumb for interpreting
the "damage" requirement: the witness must give affirmative testimony re-
garding some material fact, i.e., testimony which asserts the existence or non-
existence of a material fact.14 If the witness merely denies knowledge of facts,
such testimony is held not to "damage" the case of the party calling him and
the witness may not be impeached. 1'
In the recent case of People v. LeBeau,'0 the Supreme Court of California
interpreted the "damage" requirement anew. Defendant, charged with illegal
possession of narcotics, testified that he did not know what narcotics looked
like and thus was unaware of the nature of the capsules found in his possession.1,
On cross-examination defendant was asked whether he was a user of narcotics.
When he denied this, he was asked if he had ever told a certain woman that
he was a narcotics user. After defendant also denied this, the prosecution
called the woman as its own witness 18 and attempted to establish that the de-
fendant had made a statement to her, admitting his use of narcotics. But the
witness surprised the prosecution by denying that she had heard such a state-
ment and further denied telling the police that she had heard it.10 Over
objection, the prosecution then called a police inspector to impeach the wit-
13. E.g., Ciardella v. Parker, 10 N.J. Super. 537, 77 A.2d 496 (1950); State v.
Lemke, 207 Minn. 35, 290 N.W. 307 (1940); Malone v. Gardener, 362 Mo. 569, 242
S.W.2d 516 (1951).
14. See 15 LA. REv. STAT. § 488 (1950), quoted note 11 supra; People v. Newson,
37 Cal.2d 34, 230 P2d 618 (1951); Klein v. Keresey, 307 Mass. 51, 29 N.E.2d 703
(1940); Taucher v. Doernbecher Mfg. Co., 153 Ore. 152, 56 P.2d 318 (1936); State v.
Swan, 25 Wash.2d 319, 171 P.2d 222 (1946).
15. 3 WIGMoRE, EviDSNcE § 1043. If the prior statement does not contradict
any testimony at trial, it has, of course, no impeachment value at all and will be excluded
as hearsay. Ciardella v. Parker, 10 N.J. Super. 537, 77 A.2d 496 (1950) ; Zbikowski v.
Saroc Holding Corp., 187 Misc. 495, 67 N.Y.S.2d 222 (App. Term 19416); Fleetwood
v. State, 241 P.2d 962 (Okla. Crim. Ct. of App. 1952). However, if objection is not
made to the admission of a hearsay statement the jury may consider it as affirmative
evidence. Crawford v. United States, 198 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Crampton v.
Osborne, 356 Mo. 125, 201 S.W.2d 336 (1947); Egli v. Hutton, 135 Ore. 175, 294 Pac,
347 (1930). Nor is the admission of hearsay over objection reversible error, unless the
objector's rights were prejudiced by the admission. Ceretti v. Des Moines Ry., 228 Iowa
548, 293 N.W. 45 (1940); Gaskins v. Firemen's Ins. Co. of Newark, 206 S.C. 213, 33
S.E2d 498 (1945).
16. 39 Adv. Cal. Rep. 151, 245 P.2d 302 (1952) ; 40 CALIF. L. REv, 609 (1952).
17. People v. LeBeau, 39 Adv. Cal. Rep. 151, 152, 245 P.2d 302 (1952).
18. This witness was called both to impeach the defendant by proof of his prior
statement and to refute his testimony. The defendant's statement to her would have
been admissible as affirmative evidence as an admission against interest. 4 Wioraoang,
EVIDENcE §§ 1048-87.
19. "I don't believe that I stated anything that definite. I may have stated from con-
versations I have witnessed that the defendant talked about cocaine. Whether he used
it, I wouldn't know, and I have already told you that." People v. LeBeau, 39 Adv. Cal,
Rep. 151, 153, 245 P.2d 302, 303 (1952). The defendant stated that this witness had told
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ness by relating her earlier assertion out of court telling of defendant's state-
ment. On appeal from his conviction, defendant argued that the prosecution's
case had not been "damaged" by the woman's denial of knowledge of the
defendant's statement, and that her impeachment was not only improper but
highly prejudicial. However, the California court, sitting cn bane, thought
otherwise. Over a vigorous dissent, the court held that the prosecution was
entitled to correct the "damaging impression" which the woman might have
left with the jury that the district attorney "was harassing the defendant and
attempting to discredit him without any basis in fact.!'"a
LeBeai's "damaging impression" test expands the basis for impeachment
of a party's own witness. The holding assumes that in some circumstances, a
witness' denial of knowledge of a fact may be as "damaging" to a party's
case as a positive assertion concerning the fact. Since, under traditional
doctrine, a party's witness must give affirmative testimony before he can be
impeached, there is no question that LeBcau's "damaging impression" test
broadens the basis for introducing prior statements,2 1 although the extent of
expansion is not clear. The court may have meant to restrict the test to
criminal cases while preserving the traditional "damage" test for ciil suits,
for the prosecution has always been allowed to impeach its witnesses more freely
than has a private party.22 Or the "damaging impression" may be limited solely
to the type of situation occurring in LeBeau: where sharp questioning of a
defendant may cast the prosecution or plaintiff in a disreputable light if surprise
testimony eliminates the opportunity of showing a reasonable basis for the
questions. Of course, the rationale of the "damaging impression" test might
also apply where counsel, having sharply questioned any witness, finds that
later surprise testimony prevents his showing the reasonable basis for the
questions. In any event, the court made no attempt to limit its test in any of
these ways. And shortly after LcBean, in Bassett v. Crisp,23 the California
the police she was being supplied with narcotics by the defendant. The prosecution
offered no evidence on this point. People v. LeBeau, 106 Adv. Cal. App. 794, 901, 235
P2d 850, 854 (1951).
20. People v. LeBeau, 39 Adv. Cal. Rep. 151, 154, 245 P2d 302, 303 (1952). In
contrast, the intermediate court had held that the witness' denial that she had heard the
defendant say that he used narcotics was "testimony . . . positive and harmful to the
party calling her" and thus, that the witness' denial fell within the traditional 'damage"
requirement. People v. LeBeau, 106 Adv. Cal. App. 794, 801, 235 P.2d 850, 854 (1951).
21. LeBeaz overturns a long line of well-established California precedent. E.g.,
People v. Newson, 37 Cal2d 34, 230 P.2d 618 (1951); People v. Creeks, 141 Cal. 529,
75 Pac. 101 (1904).
22. See Young v. United States, 97 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 193S); People v. Dascola,
322 Ill. 473, 153 N.E. 710, (1926) ; State v. Trautler, 109 Mont. 275, 97 P2d 336 (1940) ;
Carroll v. State, 143 Tex. Crim. Rep. 269, 158 S.AV2d 532 (1942). And see 3 Wwiosso
EvWE.NcE § 918; May, Some Rules of Evidence, Discrediting One's O's JVitgess, 11 Am.
L. REv. 261, 264 (1877).
23. 113 Adv. Cal. App. 334, 24S P.2d 171 (1952).
Plaintiff recovered damages for injuries sustained while riding as a guest in
defendant's automobile. To support his claim of defendant's willful misconduct, plaintiff
19531
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District Court of Appeals read the test to permit introduction of prior state-
ments for impeachment of a witness in a civil case simply where the witness
unexpectedly denied knowlkdge of the facts about which he was questioned.
The witness was not a party, nor was there any question of a harmful
impression being created because of an inability to show a reasonable basis
for the questions; testimony of other witnesses amply justified counsel's line
of interrogation. In fact, then, Bassett interprets LeBeaut to make "damage"
equivalent to a showing of surprise, when a witness denies knowledge of facts.2 4
In broadening the scope of permissible impeachment situations, the Cali-
fornia courts have disregarded the prejudicial effect of admitting some im-
peaching testimony. In LeBeau, for example, the jury was permitted to hear
impeachment testimony that related directly to material issues but which
was admitted without safeguards as to its probative value. As the dissenting
justices pointed out, the prosecution's impeachment of the witness through
the introduction of the police inspector's testimony presented the jury with
a highly damaging and material "admission" by the defendant regarding his
use of narcotics. 25 It is true that the defendant did profit when the witness
denied that she told the police that defendant had said he used narcotics. But,
since she denied making this statement, she could not be cross-examined as
to its truth.26  Nor were there any indications that the conditions under
called the other occupants of the car to show that defendant had passed through a
number of red lights and that he had continued to do so after having been warned by
the other passengers. One of the other passengers, however, claimed that he did not
remember defendant's having passed through any red lights and did not remember any
warnings about this. Plaintiff was allowed to use a deposition of the witness to impeach
him. In the deposition were statements that defendant had passed through red lights
and had been warned.
The District Court of Appeals affirmed on the authority of LeBeau. It also held that
"even if the admission of such evidence was erroneous, it did not result in a miscarriage
of justice," id. at 345, 248 P2d at 177, evidently because the other witnesses had testified
to the facts contained in the deposition. If the testimony of other witnesses which removes
the possibility of "damaging impression" is also to be considered as repairing any error
from the improper impeachment, the "damaging impression" test is obviously meaningless,
24. The Bassett interpretation apparently has been confirmed by a similar California
ruling, People v. Spinosa, 115 Adv. Cal. App. 773, 252 P.2d 409 (1953). Defendant was
convicted of illegal possession of heroin. His defense was that he had no connection with
the packet of heroin which detectives had found in a toilet bowl, and that it had been
placed there by one Severson. At the examination before the committing magistrate,
Severson admitted placing the heroin in the bowl. When called at trial by the defendant,
however, Severson denied putting it there. Holding that there was no damage, the trial
court did not permit defendant to introduce Severson's prior statement. The District
Court of Appeals, citing LeBeau, reversed on the ground that "there was 'damage' both
in the testimonial and the psychological meanings of that term." Id. at 782, 252 P.2d at
414. The court found a "damaging impression" arising not from harassment of a witness
or the defendant, but from the embarrassment to the party of placing before the jury a
witness who failed to testify as expected.
25. People v. Lebeau, 39 Adv. Cal. Rep. 151, 154, 245 P.2d 302, 304 (1952).
26. Probing of the witness' observation, memory, and narration of the facts contained
in the prior statement will only bring forth the answer that it was not made or is not
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which the woman's prior assertion was made were such as to give assurance
of the statement's truth.27 Yet, despite the trial court's instruction that the
impeaching testimony was to be considered only in relation to the woman's
credibility, it is difficult to imagine that the jury was not influenced by the
police inspector's testimony in deciding whether the defendant had used
narcotics.
LeBeau and Bassett suggest a more realistic approach to the concept of
"damage." Contrary to the traditional "damage" rule, both California. cases
assume that there are situations in wlich a witness' denial of knowledge may
present just as legitimate a basis for impeachment as would an affirmative
assertion of fact. Practically speaking, this may be true. Where, for example,
a witness might be expected to know certain facts, a denial of knowledge may
certainly be equivalent to an assertion of the non-existence of those facts. 3
But while both decisions recognize that a denial of knowledge may be the
basis for impeachment, neither case presented a situation where the denial
was obviously equivalent to an affirmative statement of fact. Rather, they
emphasize a new type of "damage," one that rests on the psychological effect
on the jury of the badgering of a witness-and not on the ability of a jury to
make a finding of fact on the basis of a surprise statement. Here, too, the
approach may be realistic, for psychological effects can indeed be "damaging"
to one's case in the common sense meaning of that term.
But the question which both courts failed to face was the advisability of
permitting impeachment to offset this new type of "damage," in the light of
the likelihood of prejudicial effects on the opposing party. Sharp questioning
leading to an impression of badgering is not likely to occur unless an issue
is relatively significant to the case. But these are just the issues which should
not'be put before a jury in the form of unreliable extra-judicial statements,
with only the uncertain force of the judge's instruction to prevent their
misuse. Thus, the realistic test of LcBcau expands impeachment only where
it is least desirable to do so. Bassctt, on the other hand, presents a worie
rationale. Here, since the testimony of other witnesses amply demonstrated
a reasonable basis for counsel's sharp questioning, there was really no damage
at all. Thus the reasoning of Bassett not only broadens impeachment where
remembered. Thus the jury will be allowed to hear a statement without hmving any
opportunity to judge its accuracy.
27. In Bassett, the prior statement was contained in a deposition. Its reliability
was thus assured by the oath and cross-examination available when the statement was
made. See note 29 in fra. The court, however, made no mention of this fact in approving
the impeachment. In Spiiwsa, supra note 24, the prior statement had been made at a
hearing before a committing magistrate. Here also the safeguards of oath and cross-
e.xmination were present. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 865, 866 (Deering, 1949) ; see People v.
Cohen, 118 Cal. 74, 50 Pac. 20 (1897). These factors, however, were not mentioned
in the court's decision.
28. 3 Wi G on, EviDENcE § 1043. The intermediate cuurt in LeBcas apparently
subscribed to this view. See note 20 supra.
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prejudicial testimony is most dangerous, but it does so without even the
limited justification present in LeBeau. However, Bassett may be justified on
other grounds. While it did not form a part of the court's explicit reasoning,
the fact that the prior statement was contained in a deposition adequately
ensured the statement's reliability. 29 Thus, as a practical application of balanc-
ing danger from admitting possibly unreliable statements against necessity
of counteracting surprise, Bassett's result might even be commendable.
Experience with impeachment doctrines demonstrates that they are inade-
quate alone in coping with the harm created by a party's own witness who
unexpectedly changes his story at trial. The traditional "damage" require-
ment represents an attempt of courts to reconcile the dangers which accom-
pany the admission of unreliable extra-judicial statements with the unde-
sirability of tying the hands of a party who is harmed by the testimony of
his own witnesses. But the test does not allow a party to counter the harm
which may result from a witness' denying knowledge of facts. As a result
counsel cannot take steps to protect himself from the danger that his witnesses
will be tampered with between the time he interviews them and the time
of trial, or that a witness he interviews may have been planted.30 Counsel's
only recourse is a probably futile attempt to refresh the witness' recollection
and induce him to correct his testimony.31 But even where impeachment
does occur, it is defective. In some circumstances it admits unreliable testi-
mony. And elsewhere it may be completely impotent to rectify the harm
created by the surprise testimony. When a witness whose testimony is essen-
tial to a party's case fails to testify as expected, the essential testimony simply
becomes unavailable and impeachment is valueless, since the jury will not be
permitted to base a finding of fact on prior inconsistent statements used to
impeach. Here failure to testify can only result in a directed verdict against
the surprised party. The danger of sabotage to a party's case by the failure
of a key witness to testify as expected can be overcome only by admitting the
prior statement so that the jury may utilize it as the basis for a finding of
fact.
Courts and commentators alike have urged that prior statements of a party's
own witness be admitted affirmatively, rather than only for impeachment32
29. The policy of the hearsay rule is satisfied by the fact that a deposition is made
under oath, with the deponent available for cross-examination. E.g., CAL. Coma Civ.
PRoc. § 2004 (Deering, 1946). See Pulitzer v. Chapman, 337 Mo. 298, 85 S.W.2d 400
(1935).
30. For discussion, see May, supra note 22, at 265, and articles cited note 32 61jra.
31. Hickory v. United States, 151 U.S. 303 (1894) (prior statement may be used as
moral suasion).
32. See, e.g., Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir.), cert. dcnicd, 268
U.S. 706 (1925). State v. Jolly, 112 Mont. 352, 355, 16 P.2d 686, 688 (1941). And see
McCormick, The Turncoat Witness: Previous Statements as Substantive Evidence, 25
Tzx. L. Rzv. 573 (1947) ; Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay
Concept, 62 HAv. L. REv. 177, 192-6 (1948). Dean Wigmore approved the orthodox
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Prior extra-judicial statements of a witness may have greater evidentiary
value than those made at trial. There is less chance that the prior statements
were affected by corruption, lapse of memory, or sympathy for the opposing
side.33 Further, it has been argued that the rule forbidding use of prior
statements as the basis of a finding of fact is arbitrary, since the jury often
gives affirmative value to an impeaching statement theoretically aimed at
credibility.34 Finally, commentators have argued that since the declarant is
present at trial, much of the force behind the hearsay objection to e\tra-
judicial statements is removed. The declarant is on the stand and is available
for cross-examination both as to his prior statement and as to his statement
at trial;35 cross-examination by each side on both statements offers the jury
a perfect opportunity to decide which, if either, of the statements is true.-"
Despite the arguments of commentators, however, the presence of the witness
at trial does not always ensure the reliability of his prior statements. Where
a witness admits making the prior statement, it is true that he is subject to
cross-examination, and the reliability of the statement may thus be tested. But
where the witness denies making the statement, there is no possibility for
cross-examination as to the statement's truth. Here, use of prior statements
to counteract surprise testimony would, as does impeachment, place assertions
before a jury without check on reliability. And here the danger is even
greater, for the jury must consider the prior statement affirmatively. Where
a key witness is involved, verdict might there rest entirely on facts contained
in the prior untested statement. However, objection to the hearsay nature
of the testimony may be met if safeguards other than cross-examination are
present to ensure the statement's truth.3 7 If the prior statement is contained
in an affidavit, this assurance is provided.3 s
theories in the first edition of his treatise but upon "further rcflection" ca me t,) the con-
clusion that prior contradictory statements of a witness do not violate the policy of the
hearsay rule. 3 WGmoRE, EvmNcE § 1018.
33. McCormick, rupra note 32, at 575-82.
34. Id. at 581-2.
35. State v. Jolly, 112 Mont. 352, 355, 116 P.2d 66, 68 (1941) ; 3 Ww oax Evi-
DEXCE § 1018.
36. See Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. v. Kulp, 102 F.2d 352, 357 (8th Cir.), ccrt.
dekzied, 307 U.S. 636 (1939).
37. Traditional doctrine requires not only a finding that the statement is to Eome
degree reliable, but also that there is a "necessity" for admitting it. 5 W tiso-n, EvEz:cra
§ 1421. Although this "necessity" must often rest on the unavailability of the vitness,
it may be found, even if the witness is present, in the superior trustv-orthiness of his
extra-judicial statements. Compare the "necessity" found for admitting spontaneous utter-
ances, 6 W gSoRF, Evmr.,cE § 1748. Where "necessity" rests solely on the absence of
witnesses, its underlying premise is that the testimony will be lost unless the hearsay is
admitted. The same justification applies to prior statements, where a witness refuses to
testify as expected.
38. For the reliability of the affidavit, see note 39 infra. There are other safeguards,
besides the oath, perjury sanction, and cross-e.,mmination, iwhich may be accepted as
1953]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
Admission of affidavits as affirmative evidence would constitute a highly
effective and desirable means of combating sabotage of a case by the surprise
testimony of a party's witness. Because the affidavit is made tinder oath and
subject to the sanctions of perjury, it provides its own guarantee of reliability.
Moreover, a signed affidavit provides clear evidence of an earlier statement,
and a signature is not too difficult to prove. 40 Thus, it is unlikely that the witness
who surprises will deny making the affidavit, and, consequently, cross-
examination will usually be available as a further safeguard.41 In addition,
since the prior statements are always reliable, the necessity for the traditional
"damage" test is removed, and "surprise" alone should justify introduction
of the affidavit. 42 Thus, counsel can cope with surprise where a witness
denies knowledge. And because the affidavit will come in as affirmative
evidence, it will enable a party to counteract sabotage in a situation where
impeachment is valueless: where an essential witness surprises. At the same
time, since it is a relatively easy matter for counsel to reduce the statements
of his key witnesses to affidavit form, the affidavit provides convenient and
assuring the probative value of an extra-judicial statement. Traditionally, courts have
accepted statements of fact against interest, 5 Wmom, EviDExcE § 1455; regular busi-
ness entries, 5 id. § 1517; and spontaneous utterances, 6 id. § 1746; for this purpose.
Although some of these exceptions might be applicable and should be recognized here, the
affidavit exception would obviously be of greatest assistance to the lawyer, since the
surprise usually consists of discrepancy between pre-trial interviews by counsel and
testimony at trial.
Reliability is also assured, of course, where the statement is contained in a deposition.
See note 29 supra. Depositions are presently admissible as affirmative evidence in some
situations. E.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 26(d) (where witness is dead or otherwise unable to
attend trial) ; CAL. CODE CiV. Paoc. § 2021(6) (Deering, 1946) (if the witness' presence
cannot be procured at the time of the trial).
39. See, e.g., ILT. STAT. ANN. c. 101, § 5 (Smith-Hurd, 1935); N.Y. PENAL LAw
§ 1620 (application of perjury sanctions to affidavits). Affidavits are considered sufficiently
probative to support many types of judicial decisions such as summary judgments. FmD,
R. Civ. P. 56. For other instances where proof by affidavit is acceptable, see 6 WIGMon,
EVIDENCE § 1710.
40. Proof may be had through one who has seen the witness write, 3 WIGMoI,
EVIDENCE §§ 694-7; by the jury's comparison with known genuine documents, 3 id. §§
699-708; or by expert testimony, 3 id. § 709.
41. State v. jolly, 112 Mont. 352, 116 P2d 686 (1941).
42. The purpose of the traditional "damage" test was a reconciliation between the
danger of admitting unreliable extra-judicial statements and the undesirability of tying
the hands of a party suprised by his witness' testimony. Where the statement's reliability
is assured, the necessity for the test accordingly disappears. The requirement of "dam-
age" might, of course, be retained if use of the affidavit be considered a privilege to be
exercised only where there is strong reason to vary usual practice. But a finding of
"damage" in a factual sense depends on many variables, even where other witnesses
are available to testify to the desired facts. The witnesses' accounts may vary slightly,
and their opportunities to observe the facts may have been quite different. Since the
affidavit is reliable, there seems to be no reason to create a difficult factual determination
as a requisite to its admission when surprise occurs.
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simple insurance against later surprise harm. True, there are some dangers
attached to the use of affidavits. Counsel, in the affidavit, may overstate a
witness' testimony, or coercion may be used to induce signature to certain
facts. But since the affidavit is used only where a witness surprises at trial,
the witness is present to ex-plain why his trial testimony differs; and, as in
any case where evidence conflicts, a jury is competent to use demeanor,
plausibility, and other signs of veracity to determine which, if either, statement
is to be believed.4 3
Since the affidavit will not always be available to counteract surprise,
impeachment should be retained as an ancillary means of coping vith the
harm presented by surprise testimony. Undoubtedly, the insurance provided
by affidavits will lead counsel to obtain them wherever possible. But situations
are conceivable in which affidavits may not be obtained, as for example,
where a witness who is unwilling to give the affidavit must nevertheless be
utilized at trial. In these limited circumstances impeachment is the only
available means of counteracting surprise. But here, use of impeachment
should be restricted to those situations in which the likelihood of harm from
surprise testimony outweighs the danger of the jury's hearing unreliable
testimony. The traditional "damage" requirenent, though far from perfect,
is apparently the most desirable standard for this purpose. As a general rule,
where a witness surprises with adverse statements about material facts,
harm will be greater than where he simply denies knowledge of the facts,
for in the former instance the jury may definitely base findings on the
adverse assertions. The defects of the traditional test can in part be remedied
by a recognition of the affirmative nature of a denial of knowledge in certain
situations. Beyond this, contrary to the California "damaging impression"
test, impeachment of one's own witness should be scrupulously circumscribed.
43. The jury would be faced with a similar determination when a witness denied
making an affidavit.
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